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1“[T]he opinion is everywhere gaining ground that religion is a mere survival from
a primitive ... age, and its extinction only a matter of time.” A.E. Crawley,
1905
“I think what I and most other sociologists of religion wrote in the 1960s about
secularization was a mistake. Our understanding was that secularization and
modernity go hand in hand. ... It wasn’t a crazy theory. There was some
evidence for it. But I think it’s basically wrong. Most of the world today is
certainly not secular. It’s very religious.” P. Berger, 19971
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Intellectuals and social scientists have predicted the demise of religion since the early 1700s.2
The basic reasoning, termed the secularization hypothesis, is that the economic development,
increasing education levels, and higher urbanization associated with modernization lead to a
decrease in the demand for religion. This hypothesis, however, has been severely challenged
by mounting evidence on religious participation and beliefs in various countries. Evangelical
Christianity on the rise in the United States, Islamic fundamentalism spreading in Africa
and Asia, and increased religious participation in Eastern Europe after the fall of the USSR
all attest to the continued vitality of religion [Iannaccone (1998)]. Despite this evidence, the
debate continues [Bruce (1992), Berger (1999)]. Some researchers want the secularization
hypothesis to “rest in peace” [Stark (1999)], while others amend secularization theory in
light of new evidence [Bruce (2002)].
This paper examines the impact on religion of one aspect of modernization: economic
growth. According to Bruce (2002), a secularization theory proponent, “The more pleasant
this life, the harder it is to concentrate on the next. The more satisfying being human, the
harder to be mindful of God” (25). Economists would phrase the same idea digerently: an
increase in wages due to economic growth increases the marginal cost of religious participa-
1The Crawley and Berger quotes are both taken from Stark (1999).
2For example, writing in 1710, Englishman Thomas Woolson (1670-1731) predicted the end of Christianity
by 1900, and half a century later Voltaire predicted the end would come within ﬁfty years [Stark (1999)].
2tion, thereby leading individuals to switch from religious activities into private activities with
higher economic returns [Iannaccone (1998)]. However, this demand side logic ignores other
aspects of the religious market that counter this dynamic. For example, economic growth
can decrease the cost of supplying religious services thereby increasing religious supply; a
denomination, like other organizations, can change formal doctrines and policies, political
stances, or behavioral codes to partially accommodate changes in demand [Clark (1956)];
and, as denominations compete for “clientele” in the religious market, market forces may
compel them to cater to various segments of the religious market, thus increasing religious
pluralism [Finke and Stark (1992)]. Understanding the impact of economic growth on reli-
gion thus requires an examination of the various ways it agects both the demand and supply
sides of the religious market.
To capture various features of the religious market, this paper presents a game theoretic
study of religious competition that focuses on a denomination’s degree of “tension” with its
surrounding environment as its key characteristic [Johnson (1963), Iannaccone (1994)]. Low
tension denominations require little from their adherents, while high tension denominations
have strict requirements. Similar to Barros and Garoupa (2002), Montgomery (2003),
and McBride (2005), I model religious competition as a Hotelling location game in which
individuals’ ideal strictness levels are distributed on the unit interval. After denominations
locate on the unit interval by choosing strictness levels, each individual chooses to aliate
with whichever denomination is closest to her ideal strictness. A religious equilibrium is a
proﬁle of denomination strictness levels and membership sizes in which no religious consumer
or producer has an incentive to change behavior.
The egects of economic growth on religion are captured by examining the “comparative
statics” of the equilibria as parameters change in various ways. I ﬁnd that economic growth
can produce counteracting inﬂuences on religious pluralism and participation in an open re-
ligious market. As predicted by secularization thinkers, an increase in the return to secular
activities (e.g., higher wages) shifts religious demand to favor less strict religions. How-
ever, denominations adjust their strictness levels to maintain aliation rates. Moreover,
an increase in wage inequality can increase religious pluralism–even if the average wage
3increases–because there may be a larger number of individuals demanding high strictness.
On the supply side, if economic growth increases the suppliers’ opportunity cost of provid-
ing religious goods, then there will be a decline in pluralism as denominations exit, yet if
economic growth also improves the technology of providing religious beneﬁts, then religious
pluralism increases. Thus, whether economic growth reduces religious participation or plu-
ralism in an open religious market will depend on the overall aggregation of many factors,
and religious demise is not an automatic prediction.
The religious market structure also matters, as claimed by religious economies propo-
nents. A monopoly denomination’s only competition arises from individuals’ option to not
aliate, and it will lower its strictness to cater to those individuals considering non-aliation.
The result is a secularized monopoly religion. Economic growth does not agect the nature
of this competition, and so it has no impact on the monopoly’s behavior. Thus, the future
of religion in open and regulated religious markets can be very digerent. Regulated markets
will remain much more secularized, while open markets may retain high levels of religious
pluralism. Overall, these results exhibit elements of both secularization theory and religious
economies theory, i.e., the impact of economicg r o w t ho nr e l i g i o nd e p e n d so nt h ec h a n g e si n
both demand–as argued by the former–and supply–as argued by the latter.
These ﬁndings complement a growing literature in economics and other social sciences on
the theory of religion.3 The economics literature dates to Adam Smith who ﬁrst postulated
that clergy act in their self-interest, that market competition constrains denominations, and
that religious market regulations agect the quality of religious services [Anderson (1988)].
Modern treatments in economics can be grouped into three broad categories: research on
individual or household religious behavior, research on religious groups, and research on
religious economies [Iannaccone (1997, 1998)]. Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) present the ﬁrst
rational choice model of religious behavior wherein an individual’s choice to attend church
is an investment in after-life consumption. Subsequent empirical work provides mixed
support for their conclusions, although the evidence does indicate that the opportunity cost
3The “economics of religion” literature is to be distinguished from the “religious economics” literature
[Kuran (1994)]. Iannaccone (1998) reviews many key issues in the economics of religion literature.
4of time impacts religious participation [Iannaccone (1998)]. Iannaccone (1990) extends this
basic model to include “religious capital,” whereby religious participation today increases
the beneﬁts of future participation. These experience egects help explain the inﬂuence of
religious upbringing and the prevalence of intra-faith marriages.
The study of religious groups looks more closely at how denominations provide religious
beneﬁts. Iannaccone (1988, 1992) considers a religious group as a club, and shows how high
membership costs (strictness) act to screen out low-participation members and reduce the
monitoring costs of identifying religious free-riders. Individuals with fewer secular oppor-
tunities will join strict denominations (sects) to obtain larger religious beneﬁts, while those
with better opportunities will join less demanding denominations (churches). Montgomery
(1996) examines religious group “sect-to-church” dynamics to show how a religious group’s
strictness changes over time as the younger generation, raised in the denomination but not
in favor of the its strictness, exert inﬂuence to make the group more mainstream. Ekelund,
Herbert, and Tollison (1989, 2004) depict the medieval Catholic Church as a monopoly ﬁrm
(instead of a club) to explain its various actions.
My paper belongs in the third category. It is most closely related to three papers that
model religious competition as a Hotelling location game. Barros and Garoupa (2002) ex-
amine religious competition in monopoly and duopoly religious markets, while Montgomery
(2003) and McBride (2005) examine the relationship between religious pluralism and reli-
gious participation. My paper digers by addressing the question of how economic growth
agects religious competition. There is also a growing empirical literature on religious mar-
kets [e.g., Barro and McCleary (2002, 2003a, 2003b), Gruber (2005)] to some of which I
relate my ﬁndings in the conclusion.
The relevant non-economics literature is much larger.4 Proponents of secularization
thinking have presented several mechanisms by which secularization occurs. Tschannen
(1991) and Swatos and Christiano (1999) provide overviews of the secularization paradigm,
and Bruce (2002) provides a recent comprehensive treatment. Secularization critics empha-
4For a broad treatment of each side of the secularization debate, simultaneously read pro-secularization
Bruce (2002) and anti-secularization Stark and Finke (2000).
5size the importance of the supply side of religious markets in explaining trends in religious
participation. Low religious participation in western Europe, long seen as evidence in sup-
port of the secularization hypothesis, is thought to be due to regulations that deter religious
entry rather than to shifting religious demand, and high religious participation in America is
due to its open religious economy and vibrant religious entrepreneurs [Warner (1993), Stark
and Iannaccone (1994), Finke (1997)]. Their supply side argument represents a paradigm
shift in thinking about religion, and it draws language and ideas from rational choice eco-
nomic thinking in making its arguments [Young (1997)]. Stark and Finke (2000) present
a comprehensive treatment of this approach. My model has close ties to the supply side
paradigm because it captures the role of supply side regulations on religious competition.
However, it also complements the work of proponents of secularization theory by examining
how changes in religious demand due to economic growth can agect religious outcomes. In
this manner, my model provides a theoretical framework which can capture elements of both
sides of the debate.
2M o d e l
Sociologists since as early as Johnson (1963) have characterized denominations by the level of
“tension” they maintain with their local secular society. Some denominations, called sects,
exist in a state of tension with the existing society because of their rejection of prevailing
moral codes, while other denominations, called churches, exist with little tension because
they accept the prevailing moral codes. Iannaccone (1994) uses a uni-dimensional measure
of denominational “strictness” to capture tension since high tension denominations impose
stricter behavioral standards on their members.5 For example, he ranks denominations in
the United States as follows: Episcopal, Methodist, Presbyterian, and the United Church of
5See Chapter 6 of Stark and Finke (2000) for a discussion of another use of the terms “church” and
“sect.” In short, a church is usually thought of as a conventional religious organization that accepts the
existing social order and does not impose demands far beyond society’s moral code. A sect, on the other
hand, demands a “higher” order of living. The church-low tension, sect-high tension connections follow.
A sect can be further distinguished from a “cult.” A sect is rooted in the dominant religious tradition of
the society, while a cult is a novel or alien religion. Because I use a uni-dimensional measure for tension or
strictness, I do not distinguish between sect and cult. See Dawson (2003) for a discussion of cults.
6Christ are low strictness, liberal mainline denominations; Evangelical, Lutheran, Reformed
Church, Disciples of Christ are medium-low strictness, moderate mainline denominations;
Missouri Synod Lutheran and Southern Baptist are conservative, medium-high strictness
denominations; and Nazarene, Assemblies of God, Seventh Day Adventist, and Mormon are
high-tension denominations.
The following model equates tension with strictness. Consider a continuum of utility
maximizing individuals that diger only in their preferred strictness levels. In particular, if
i chooses to aliate with denomination d,t h e nh e rp a y o g is
ui = |si  sd|, (1)
where si 5 [0,1] is her most preferred strictness level and sd 5 [0,1] is denomination d’s
strictness level. Individual i can also choose to not aliate with any denomination, in
which case she receives payog si (non-aliation equals choosing strictness 0). If i is
indigerent between two denominations (or between aliation and non-aliation) then she
chooses to aliate with each denomination (or non-aliation) with equal probability. Ideal
strictnesses are distributed according to c.d.f. F (s).
Let D = {1,2,...} be the set of potential denominations. Each potential denomination
d, if it chooses to enter the religious market, chooses strictness level sd to maximize its payog
function
Zd (sd,s 3d)=Amd (sd,s 3d)  c, (2)
where md is the ﬁnal share of the population that are members of denomination d, A>0i s
a religious technology parameter, and c>0i st h eﬁxed cost of providing religious services.
The technology parameter A captures various elements of religious supply, e.g., the ability of
the denomination to extract beneﬁts from its members. If the denomination does not enter,
it expends its egorts in a secular industry and earns proﬁts Z,s ot h a tZ is d’s opportunity
cost of providing religious services.
Decisions are made in the following order.
1. Potential denominations simultaneously choose to either locate at a strictness level or
7postpone the decision to period 2. Once a potential denomination locates, it cannot
change its strictness or exit.
2. Any potential denomination that did not locate in period 2 now chooses to locate
or never locate (exit). Assume that it exits if indigerent between entering and not
entering.
3. After observing the located denominations’ strictness levels, individuals simultaneously
choose denominational aliations.
4. Located denominations and individuals receive their payogs, and non-located potential
denominations receive payog Z.
The representation of consumers’ religious preferences in (1) greatly simpliﬁes the af-
ﬁliation decision. It abstracts from the socialization of children in their parents’ religion,
conversion experiences, and other qualitative features of religious goods that make them
digerent from normal secular goods.6 It is, however, based on the following model of utility
maximization used by Iannaccone (1988, 1994) and Montgomery (1996).
Let each individual i have utility function
ui = u(wi,s d)=Z (wi,s d)+R(sd), (3)
where Z is the “secular” payog, R is the “religious” payog, wi > 0i si’s wage rate, and
sd 5 [0,1] is the level of religious strictness i m u s t“ p a y ”t oa liate with denomination d.
Let Zw > 0, Zs < 0, Zws < 0,R s > 0. The Z derivatives capture the ideas that stricter
denominations impose restrictions on secular activities, and that the marginal egects of
these increase in the wage rate (those with higher wages lose more secular payogs). The
R derivative captures the notion that a stricter denomination must oger larger religious
beneﬁts to aliated individuals who abide the higher strictness [Iannaccone (1992)].
Individuals diger only in their wage rates, which are distributed according to distribu-
tion function F (w). Utility maximization implies that, given her wage wi, an individual
6For example, some religious goods are promises concerning the next life, which are not directly consumed
in this life and which are not falsiﬁable.
8will choose a denomination that best equates her marginal rates of substitution across sec-
ular and religious beneﬁts. Note that sW
d (in the interior of (0,1)) maximizes i’s utility if
Rs (sW
d)=Zs (wi,s W
d). By the envelope theorem, we obtain sW
d (wi), i’s uniquely most preferred
strictness, such that sW
d (wi) is monotonically decreasing in wi, i.e., a higher wage increases
the opportunity cost of strictness, thereby lowering the ideal strictness. Because strictness
levels run on a continuum, it will generally be true for most i that no denomination will have
strictness sW
d (wi). With continuous and digerentiable R and Z functions, i would prefer sd
over sd0 if sW
d (wi) <s d <s d0.W h e n sd <s W
d (wi) <s d0, then there will be some s0 5 (sd,s d0)
such that if sW
d (wi)=s0 then i will be indigerent between sd and sd0. Under appropriate
conditions on Z and R, we obtain the preferences depicted in (1). However, the key is that
we can tie the distribution of ideal preferences directly to the distribution of wages. I return
to this fact when discussing the impact of economic growth on religious preferences.
The depiction of denominations’ preferences in (2) abstracts from actual denomination
leaders’ motivations and digers from other representations of denomination preferences and
religious production technology. For example, Barros and Garoupa’s (2002)7 assume each
denomination maximizes the utility of its membership, Iannoccone (1992) describes how
the public good nature of religious services, whereby the services a denomination provides
may depend on its membership size, and Ekelund, Hebert, and Tollison (1989) examine the
medieval Church as a rent-seeking institution. Although these can be added to my model,
my simpliﬁed preferences capture the notion that, all else equal, denomination leaders prefer
to have larger memberships. This assumption is not without merit since denominations
that do not care about membership size are likely to not survive in the long run.
Altogether, this is a Hotelling location model with two unique features: the presence of a
ﬁrm with location ﬁx e da t0 ,a n dat w os t a g er e p r e s e n t a t i o no fﬁrm entry. The ﬁrst feature
captures various elements related to non-aliation. If religious beneﬁts derive only from
7My model was developed independently of Barros and Garoupa (2002) and originally used a dierent
denomination production funtion. It assumed d = Amdsd, which captures the notion that a denomination
must oer larger beneﬁts to its membership if it requires higher strictness from them, and these larger beneﬁts
are only possible at an increased cost. The main implication of this dierent production function is that
equilibrium denomination sizes will dier according to strictness, whereas with ﬁxed cost c equilibrium
denomination sizes are roughly equal.
9membership in a denomination, then not aliating yields no religious beneﬁts. Since there
is a cost to strictness (Zs < 0), an individual who does not aliate will choose strictness 0.
The second feature, two-stage denomination entry, captures the idea that denomina-
tions currently in the market must be concerned not just about competition from located
denominations but also from future potential entrants. In technical terms, actors in an equi-
librium should consider not just their own deviations holding others’ entry decisions ﬁxed,
but should also consider entry that might result from their own deviations. A standard
static non-cooperative concept (e.g., Nash equilibrium) would not consider such dual devia-
tions if there is only one period of entry. The two-stage entry captures dual deviations in
a standard equilibrium concept since a denomination that locates early must be concerned
about entry in stage 2.
3 Equilibria with Uniform F (s)
As will be discussed in greater detail below, there will generally be multiple equilibria of
this religious market game. I focus on a particular class of subgame perfect equilibria
(SPE) in which DW potential denominations locate in period 1, the remaining potential
denominations exit in period 2, and all individuals aliate with the denomination whose
strictness is closest on the unit interval (with non-aliation still an option at strictness 0).8
This equilibrium, which I denote as a DW-SPE, has a pertinent interpretation. A DW-SPE
can be considered as the long-run steady state of a religious market in which denominations
can adjust their strictness levels over time in response to other denominations’ strictness
levels, and “incumbent” denominations face the threat of religious entry.
To illustrate the essential strategic elements of the game, I restrict attention in this
section to the special case of a uniform distribution of ideal strictnesses, F (s)=s.L e t u s
now construct a simple DW-SPE.
8If located denominations receive payos higher than the reservation opportunity , then there will likely
be competition in the ﬁrst period to see who gets to enter. Thus, there can exist equilibria in which mixed
entry strategies are played in period 1. I do not examine SPE with such mixed strategies. The primary
reason is that a pure equilibrium corresponds better to a long-run equilibrium with long-lived denominations.
10Let
e s1 =1 
c + Z
A
e s2 =1  3
c + Z
A








If e sd > 0,w i t h0 > 0 small, then have d locate at e sd in period 1. Otherwise, if e sd  0, then
have d n o tl o c a t ei np e r i o d1a n de x i ti np e r i o d2 . A sc o n s t r u c t e d ,w eh a v eap r o ﬁle with
denominations spread across the unit interval.
Figure 1(a) depicts this proﬁle if A =6a n dc + Z =1 . W eh a v ee s1 = 5
6, e s2 = 3
6, e s3 = 1
6
and, since, e sd  0 for all d>3, any such d exits in stage 2. Given these locations for
denominations 1, 2, and 3, any individual to the right of s1 will aliate with denomination
1. Individuals between s1 and s2 will aliate with either denomination 1 or 2 depending
on which is closer. Individuals to the left of s2 but closer to 0 will not aliate, while those
closer to s2 will aliate with denomination 2. The resulting membership sizes are m1 = 2
6,
m2 = 2
6, m3 = 1.5
6 , and 0.5
6 not aliating.
It is straightforward to show that this proﬁle is an equilibrium. First, consider the payog
to a denomination d that did not enter in period 1 but considers entering in period 2. It
will not enter unless Amd  c>Z , md > c+Z
A ,w h e r emd is the size of membership it will
g e ti fi te n t e r sa n dh o l d i n gﬁxed all other denominations’ actions. Given the current proﬁle
of denomination locations, d cannot get a membership that large. Its best location to 1’s
right is at s1 + 0, but this yields md = c+Z
A  1
20 < c+Z
A :i t g e t s t h e c+Z
A  0 members to the
right of its location but only 1
20 members to its left. If d locates between 1 and 2, between
2 and 3, or exactly at s1 or s2, it will get membership equal to c+Z
A .I f i t l o c a t e s b e t w e e n 3
and 0 or exactly at 3, it will get membership less than c+Z
A .S i n c e d c a nd on ob e t t e rt h a n
its exit payog c+Z
A , exiting is a best response for d in period 2.
Now consider whether a located denomination wants to move its location. Although
111 can potentially increase its denomination size by deviating slightly to its left, doing so
will leave room for entry on its right by a ﬁrm in period 2, so 1 will not want to shift left.
It will not want to shift right either since if it does, it decreases its membership size and
creates room for an entrant to enter between 1 and 2. By similar logic, no other located
denomination can improve by deviating to the opposite side of another denomination.
This is not the only DW-SPE. Figure 1(b) depicts an equilibrium in which s1 = 5
6 as
before, but where s2 and s3 have both shifted rightward to s2 = 4
6 and s3 = 2
6.I n f a c t ,








and s3 = s2  2
6 will be an equilibrium. These are obtained by sliding s2 and s3 to the
right when starting from the equilibrium in Figure 1(a). There is also another continuum
of equilibria: any proﬁle with s1 = 5
6, s2 = 3






is also an equilibrium. There
can also exist equilibria with DW = 4, such as the one depicted in Figure 1(c). Again, there
is a continuum of DW = 4 equilibria, each obtained by sliding all denominations but s1.
Although there are many equilibria, these equilibria all share a few key features.
Proposition 1: Suppose a uniform distribution of ideal strictnesses F (s).A
DW-SPE with DW > 1 must have the following features.
(a) Any located denomination d must have md  c+Z
A .












(d) The strictest denomination d =1must be at located s1 =1 c+Z
A .
If (a) did not hold, then a located denomination would be better og exiting than remaining
in the market. If (b) did not hold, then entry will occur between 0 and sDW.I f ( c ) d i d
not hold then entry would occur between sd+1 and sd. For (d), note that denomination
1 increases her membership by shifting towards s2 if no entry occurs in period 2 after her
deviation. However, if s1 < 1  c+Z
A , there will be entry to 1’s right. Thus, 1  c+Z
A is the
farthest left she can be and still prevent entry on her right. Because she has that incentive
to shift left, she will locate at 1  c+Z
A .
12P a r t( a )i m p l i e st h a taDW-SPE must have suciently few denominations that any located
denomination receives enough membership to remain in the market, while (b) and (c) imply
that there must be suciently many denominations to prevent the existence of niches that
would lead to entry. Thus, for any given A, c,a n dZ, there will usually exist a compact




Note as well that if A increases or if c or Z decreases, all else constant, then this range will
shift to the right. That is, both DW
L and DW
H will increase if A increases or if c or Z decreases.
These equilibria demonstrate how religious competition determines the distribution of
denomination types and membership sizes. The incentive to obtain membership drives
denominations to specialize by choosing unique strictness levels in order to obtain market
niches, but in equilibrium, they will also be not so far from other denominations that there is
room for religious entry. Thus, the underlying parameters of the model place restrictions on
both the distribution of denomination types and on the sizes of those denominations. Some
denominations will maintain large tension with the surrounding environment, while others
will not demand much from their members. Summarizing:
Proposition 2: Fix A, c,a n dZ, and suppose uniform F (s).
(a) There always exists a DW-SPE with DW  0.
(b) DW
L and DW
H will both increase as A increases, c decreases, or Z decreases.
(c) Average denomination sizes decrease (generically) as A increases, c de-
creases, or Z decreases.
4 G r o w t hi na nO p e nR e l i g i o u sM a r k e t
To examine how economic growth agects religious vitality, we need measures of vitality. I
consider two concepts that have received much attention in the literature: religious pluralism
and religious participation.9 Since equilibrium denomination sizes are roughly equal, and
since they are spread across the strictness spectrum, one simple measure of religious pluralism
9For recent formal examinations of these two concepts, see Montgomery (2003) and McBride (2005).
Chaves and Gorski (2001) survey the earlier empirical work.
13is the number of equilibrium denominations so that one equilibrium is more pluralistic than
another if it has more denominations. We may also suppose that pluralism should reﬂect
the underlying religious behavior and not just denominational aliations so that pluralism
should be tied to religious strictness. Essentially, one equilibrium is more pluralistic than
another if it exhibits a wider range of observed strictness. As long as the non-aliation
option exists, this range will generally be [0,s 1].10
I consider two measures of religious participation. The ﬁrst is the percent of the pop-
ulation aliated with a denomination so that one equilibrium has more participation than
a n o t h e ri fi th a sas m a l l e rp e r c e n to fn o n - a liated individuals. However, aliation does not
necessarily capture religious behavior if behavior is tied to religious strictness. For example,
less strict denominations tend to impose fewer behavioral requirements–such as attendance
at church meetings–on their members than stricter denominations [Iannaccone (1994)], so
that a DW = 1 equilibrium with a low strictness denomination may exhibit less religious
participation than a DW = 1 equilibrium with a stricter denomination. Thus, insofar as par-
ticipation is tied to strictness, the range of observed strictness [0,s 1] is a better indication
of religious participation. It turns out that these distinctions will matter.
4.1 Growth and Religious Supply
It will be easiest to ﬁrst examine the egects of economic growth on the supply side of the
religious market. Consider now the egect of increased secular opportunities on religious
suppliers. As secular opportunities increase, the opportunity cost Z of producing religious
beneﬁts also increases. This will decrease the number of denominations and increase the
size of denominations (Proposition 2), and the strictest denomination will become less strict
(Proposition 1). Thus, according to both pluralism measures, we will observe a decrease in
religious pluralism.
Religious participation is also likely to drop according to each measure. Since the least
strict denomination DW must be no farther than 2c+Z
A from strictness 0, an increase in Z can
10Many of the empirical studies of the relationship between pluralism and participation use a Herﬁndahl
index to measure pluralism, however this measure is problematic [Voas, Olson, and Crockett (2002)].
14result in the DW being more strict. This, in turn, leads to an increase in the non-aliated
population. This might sound contradictory since the most strict denomination is becoming
less strict, but it is clearly possible if the number of denominations decreases. If we consider
the strictness measure of participation, then the shrinking of the range [0,s 1] signiﬁes a drop
in participation.
While both pluralism and participation will decrease as economic growth increases the
opportunity cost of religious production, it also possible that economic growth increases
the religious technology A or decreases the cost of religious production c. For example,
denominations may discover cheaper direct costs of religious advertising, better capabilities
of monitoring denomination members or leaders, more egective abilities to extract resources
from aliated members, and so on. Since an increase in A or a decrease in c has the
opposite egect as an increase in Z, such positive supply shocks will ogset the egect of the
increased opportunity costs on both pluralism and participation. Which egect dominates is
a topic I return to later, but for now Proposition 3 summarizes the results relating growth
and religious supply.
Proposition 3: Through the supply side of the religious market, economic
growth can increase or decrease religious pluralism and participation in a DW-
SPE. Speciﬁcally,
(a) Increases in the opportunity cost Z of providing religion will decrease religious
pluralism and religious participation.
(b) Increases in the religious technology A or decreases in the religious production
costs c will increase religious pluralism and participation.
4.2 Growth and Religious Demand
Considering the impact of economic growth on religious demand means considering how it
agects the distribution of ideal strictnesses F (s) ,w h i c hi nt u r nr e q u i r e sm o v i n ga w a yf r o m
the uniform F (s) assumption. To narrow my focus, I restrict my analysis to bell-shaped
(i.e., single-peaked) distributions for which the bell (peak) occurs at some s in the interior
15of the unit interval. Stark and Finke (2000) suggest that such a distribution approximates
actual religious preferences.
Figures 2(a)-(c) depict three bell-shaped distributions. Figure 2(a) has a p.d.f. that
is symmetric about s = 1
2. Figure 2(b) has a lower mean than 2(a), i.e., (b) is ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominated by (a). Figure 2(c) depicts a mean-preserving spread of (a), i.e.,
(c) is second-order stochastically dominated by (a). Figure 2(d) illustrates the limiting case
of the uniform distribution for comparison.
Analysis with a bell-shaped distribution digers slightly from the analysis with the uniform
distribution. With generic F (s), the strictest denomination must still locate as far left as
possible without allowing entry on its right, but we must now consider the shape of the
distribution. We can calculate s1 to be the location for 1 that makes the a potential entrant
exactly equal between entering and not entering:









This is depicted in Figure 2(a). The uniform case which has s1 =1 c+Z
A is clearly just a
special case.
Things are not as simple for the other denominations. Consider the least strict denomi-
nation DW. In the uniform case, entry yields membership size
sW
DW
2 for entry by a denomination
in period 2 at any location on DW’s left, but in the general F (s) case, the entrant’s mem-
b e r s h i ps i z ew i l ld e p e n do nw h e r ei te n t e r so nDW’s left. If the p.d.f. is increasing over
(0,s W
DW)–which is the case if sW
DW is to the left of the peak–then potential entrant d will get
larger membership by choosing as high a strictness as possible in that interval, essentially
sd = sW
DW  0.I n t h i s c a s e , sW

























DW is to right of the peak then d might not enter at sW
DW  0 but might instead locate
closer to the peak to get a larger membership. More generally, to ﬁnd the highest strictness














 c  Z for all 0 <s d <s
W
DW.
We can focus on these two boundary denominations–the most strict and least strict–
when examining the egects of economic growth on religious demand. As mentioned earlier,
economic growth that increases average wages will increase the return to secular activities,
thereby increasing the opportunity cost of religious activity. With equation (3) as a mo-
tivation for the representation of preferences in (1), this can be manifest as a shift in the
distribution from F (s)t oF0 (s) such that F0 (s)i sﬁrst-order stochastically dominated by
F (s), i.e., F0 (s)  F (s)f o ra l ls. This constitutes a shift in the entire distribution and
implies that the mean ideal strictness is now lower under F0 (s), akin to a shift from Figure
2(a) to 2(b).
Denominations will respond to this shift in preferences by locating at lower strictnesses.









, denomination 1 will be less strict than before. This leftward shifts will be
similar for all located denomination, including the least strict denomination DW.B e c a u s e
denomination strictnesses adapt to the shifting preferences, denomination membership sizes
might not change very much if at all, and pluralism as measured by the number of denomi-
nations would not change. As measured by the range of religious behavior, however, there
will be a decrease in pluralism as s1 decreases.
W h e t h e ro rn o tn o n - a liation increases will depend on the way the c.d.f. shifts at low
strictness levels. Although more individuals prefer low strictness levels, DW’s strictness
will also decrease. If religious participation decreases as non-aliation increases, then the
egect of increased secular opportunities on religious participation is unclear since we do not
know if non-aliation changes. However, if participation is tied more directly to strictness,
then there will likely be a decrease in religious participation as denominations choose lower
strictness levels. Summarizing, increased returns to secular activities will decrease pluralism
and participation if their measures are tied to strictness, but they may have little egect on
pluralism in the sense of the number of denominations or on participation in the form of
17aliation.
Economic growth may also cause other changes in the distribution of ideal strictnesses.
Suppose economic growth is uneven so that there is increased inequality in the return to
secular activities (e.g., increased wage inequality). With (3) as motivation, the result is an
increase in the variance of ideal strictnesses. As before, the shift in demand does not agect
the number of denominations or aliation rates, but it will agect observed strictness.
This can be demonstrated using the concept of second-order stochastic dominance. If
F (s)a n dF0 (s) have the same mean and
R s
0 F (s)ds 
R s
0 F0 (s)ds for all s,t h e nw es a y
that F0 (s) is a mean-preserving spread of F (s), i.e., F0 (s) is second-order stochastically
dominated by F (s). This is akin to a shift from Figure 2(a) to 2(c). Wider variance
implies that f0 (s) has fatter tails than f (s). If sW
1 w a si nt h er i g h tt a i lo ff (s), but the tail
is now fatter, then s0W
1 >s W
1. On the left side, if sW
DW was in the left tail of f (s)b u tt h a t
tail is now fatter, then s0W
DW <s W
DW. Thus, if denominations span a sucient area of the unit
interval, then increased inequality will increase the range of observed strictnesses. Thus, we
may observe an increase in observed pluralism and participation.
Altogether, economic growth that increases the returns to secular activities will decrease
or have little egect on pluralism and participation, but the impact might be ogset if there
is a coincidental increase in inequality of those returns. Just like the egects of economic
growth on religion through the supply side, the egects on religion through the demand side
are ambiguous ap r i o r i .
Proposition 4: (Growth–demand side) Through the demand side of the re-
ligious market, economic growth can increase or decrease religious pluralism and
participation in a DW-SPE. Speciﬁcally,
(a) Increases in the return to secular activities will have little or no egect on the
number of denominations and aliation rates, but it will decrease pluralism and
participation tied to strictness.
(b) Increases in inequality of the returns to secular activity (if denominations
span the strictness domain) will have little or no egect on the number of denom-
18inations and aliation rates, but it will increase pluralism and participation tied
to strictness.
4.3 Discussion
Economic growth potentially agects both the demand and supply sides of an open religious
market, and it can do so in a manner that produces countervailing inﬂuences. Thus, it is
not economic growth per se that will be “the end of religion,” but the nature of that growth
that determines religion’s future. Theories that link economic growth only to diminished
demand for religious activities may therefore incorrectly predict the demise of religion if they
ignore both opposing demand side forces and adaptation by religious suppliers.
That is not to say that religious demise is impossible. The model does not predict the
demise or the triumph of religion, nor does it predict that demise or triumph is impossible.
Each is possible depending on how economic growth occurs. If rising opportunity costs to
religious suppliers and demanders overpower other egects of growth, then religious pluralism
and participation will decline as predicted by the secularization paradigm. If the other
egects keep pace, then religion will survive.
Which egects will dominate? While this is ultimately an empirical question beyond
the scope of this paper, I mention here two issues of direct relevance. The ﬁrst relates to
adaptation and innovation by religious suppliers. The very deﬁnition of economic growth
suggests that producers’ secular opportunities Z will increase. Moreover, the Baumol Egect,
which states that productivity growth is likely to be slower in labor-intensive industries such
as religion, suggests that Z would increase faster than c decreases and A increases [Baumol
(1967)]. While this suggests eventual religious demise (all else constant), another feature
of the Baumol Ege c tm a yw o r kt oo gset this trend. If religious producers’ skills are tied to
labor-intensive industries, then their outside opportunities will not rise as quickly as outside
opportunities for secular good producers with skills in capital-intensive industries. Thus, Z
might not increase very rapidly for religious producers, and changes in c and A may keep
pace or even outpace the increase in Z.
Some anecdotal evidence indicates that suppliers are adapting to meet changing religious
19demand. For example, some religious groups are attempting to adapt twenty-ﬁrst century
technology to suit their uses. Consider the following from The Christian Century (2002):
Technology has found religion; or perhaps it’s the other way around, according
to the New York Times (May 16). Churches are going beyond the typical digital
sound systems, PowerPoint sermon outlines and the use of video clips to illustrate
sermon points. Take “The Rock,” an interdenominational church in Roseville,
California. “The church has a 330-seat sanctuary with a big-screen television and
integrated keypads built into seat armrests. The buttons on the keypads allow
members of the congregation to answer multiple-choice questions asked by the
pastor during the service. The answers, which often touch on delicate issues like
emotional abuse or spending habits, are quickly compiled into percentages. ...
The pastor takes the responses and adjusts his sermon on the spot, recounting
stories about life experiences that address the congregation’s concerns” (9).
In fact, some secularists fear that religionists are too successful in adapting new technologies
into religious production. An article in Free Inquiry [Porteous (1994)], a secular human-
ist publication, warns its readers of how the religious right uses technology to make the
political aspect of its religious production more ecient. Nonetheless, religious producers
such as Bonnot, Boomershire, and Sweeney (2001)–a priest, a minister, and a producer of
spirituality-enhancing media products–argue that more supply side adaptations are required
to keep pace with changing demand.
The second issue relates to how easy it is to substitute away from religious consumption.
With diminishing marginal utility to secular consumption, each unit increase in wage will lead
to successively smaller decreases in ideal strictnesses, thereby implying that religious demand
might not shift as quickly as secularization theorists suggest. Also, certain religious beneﬁts
do not have egective secular substitutes. For example, while a denomination provides
beneﬁts consumable in the present such as friendships and social support, Stark and Finke
(2000) emphasize that religion also provides promises of other worldly rewards. Since other
worldly rewards are not consumed in the present, it is the promise of other worldly rewards
20that is valued, and these promises are tied to religious doctrine and behavior. If these
promises do not have adequate secular substitutes, then rising income levels will not lead
individuals to completely substitute away from religious consumption.
Overall, the successful adaptation of religious producers and the uniqueness of religious
goods will determine whether economic growth will cause religious decline. Given that
religion has strived in some countries that have experienced a century of economic growth,
such as the U.S.A., the future of religion may instead involves more of the same. Religious
suppliers will continue to adapt, and religion will not decline.
5 Regulated Religious Markets
Secularization thinking survives because its proponents point to highly secularized western
Europe for empirical veriﬁcation. Low religious participation is found in mono-Catholic
Belgium and France, mono-Protestant England, Wales, Scandinavia, and Iceland, and multi-
denominational Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands [Barros and Garoupa (2002)].
While proponents of secularization thinking refer to these countries as examples in support
of their case, supply-side thinkers argue that secularized Western Europe is due more to
religious market regulations than to secularized religious preferences [Finke (1997)].
Religious markets in the past and today are regulated in primarily two ways: sup-
pression and subsidy. Suppression includes actual laws or other state-sponsored activities
that forbid or inhibit the formation of new denominations or the activities of their members.
Consider some examples from current-day Germany: Scientologists have been excluded from
government employment; entry visas have been refused to prominent non-German Scientol-
ogists; some public ocials have suggested putting Jehovah’s Witnesses under secret service
watch; new denominations are routinely hindered from getting proper licenses or building
permits; and many Pentecostal groups cannot get tax-free status unless they register as
secular groups instead of churches [Stark and Finke (2000)]. Subsidies include the provision
of state resources for church operations, such as the payment of church employees’ salaries.
The Church of Sweden, for example, runs on taxes paid for by all Swedes (even those not
21aliated with the Church of Sweden), the Swedish clergy have civil service job security, and
other denominations do not receive the same support [Stark and Finke (2000)].
Regulation has the potential to impact religious competition in a variety of ways. It can
raise the cost of entry to new denominations, thus leading to larger incumbent monopoly
or duopoly denominations. Adam Smith commented years ago that it can also alter the
incentives of religious providers, e.g., a protected incumbent who does not need to compete
against other denominations for religious clientele will be less likely to provide high quality
religious beneﬁts. Finally, an incumbent may be more concerned about the political econ-
omy or public choice of maintaining the advantaged market position than with adapting to
changes in consumers’ religious demand.
To examine the impact of economic growth in a regulated setting, consider the extreme
case of a regulated monopoly setting. Assume that regulations are suciently permanent
so that there is no threat of entry, and that the monopoly needs only focus on amassing
membership instead of trying to maintain its monopoly position.







All individuals to the right of sM will always aliate with the monopoly, while only those
between
sM
2 and sM on its left will aliate. Notice that this payog increases as sM approaches
strictness 0, since lowering its strictness increases its membership. In egect, the monopoly’s
only competition comes from individuals’ non-aliation option, so by lowering its strictness
it can entice individuals to switch from non-aliation to aliation. In equilibrium, the
monopoly will locate at sM = 0,11 which results in low pluralism and high aliation. And if
participation is related more to strictness than aliation, then the monopoly will can have
high membership and low participation.
This result matches the predictions of the supply side theory of religion that a monopoly
denomination will not demand much from its aliates (low strictness), and its aliates will
not devote much to the denomination in return [Stark and Finke (2000)]. Such denomina-
tions are already secularized in that they do not place demands on members much above
11By locating at sM = 0, individuals are indierent between non-ailation and aliation. So the only
time locating at sM = 0 would be a best response is if F (0)  1
2.
22what secular society already demands. Such is the case in some regulated religious markets
of Western Europe. To choose one particular example, again consider the Church of Sweden.
Ninety-ﬁve percent of all Swedes are registered as members, but only two percent attend on
any given Sunday [Finke (1997)].
Notice that economic growth does not change the outcome in the monopoly setting. The
monopoly will still locate at 0 even with ﬁrst-order or second-order stochastic shifts in F (s)
and with changes in A, c,a n dZ. I ti sp o s s i b l et h a ti fZ increases too much with respect to
A and c, then remaining in the market becomes too costly even for the monopoly religion, in
which case the equilibrium has no denomination. However, given that monopoly religions
are often subsidized, it is likely that c will also remain suciently low. Thus, economic
growth is not likely to change the outcomes in a regulated religious monopoly. A regulated
market will remain secularized as economic growth occurs because of supply side regulations.
Proposition 5: A regulated monopoly denomination will choose minimum
strictness, and economic growth will have no egect the denomination’s behavior.
A regulated duopoly will have a limited degree of denominational competition. The
duopoly outcomes ﬁt qualitatively between the open and monopoly markets, i.e., strictnesses
and pluralism will be lower than in an open market and higher than in monopoly. The
same holds for the egects of economic growth. The egects on pluralism, aliation, and
participation are limited.
These ﬁndings support the religious economies claim that “To the degree that a religious
economy is unregulated, it will tend to be very pluralistic” [Stark and Finke (2000) p. 198].
In support of this claim, Barro and McCleary’s (2002, 2003a, 2003b) recent cross-country
regressions ﬁnd that countries with religious regulations exhibit less religious vitality.12 Re-
ligious economies proponents have long referred to thriving religious organizations in the
United States as the best example of the impact of open religious markets [Warner (1993)].
While some relate American religiosity to cultural backwardness, a lack of sophistication,
12Although they also ﬁnd that countries with state religions exhibit higher vitality, likely due to religious
subsidies.
23too little inﬂuence by intellectuals, and other factors [Stark (1999)], my model presents a
digerent picture. Instead of “American exceptionalism” on the demand side, it is an open
market environment on the supply side that explains American religious pluralism.
Observers have also noted that American clergy are very responsive to their congrega-
tions, and even act to maintain or increase their memberships [Stark and Finke (2000)].
Since my model predicts that pluralism is increasing in A, it could be argued that deregula-
tion of a religious economy acts to increase pluralism through two mechanisms. There is a
direct egect of a decreased cost of entry, but there may also be an indirect egect through a
changing in denominational preferences. In an open and competitive religious market, only
those clergy that are responsive to their members’ needs (i.e., have higher A) will succeed
and, therefore, survive. Thus, reducing regulations can also lead to denominational leader-
ships that care more about meeting the religious needs of their memberships, which in turn
increases religious pluralism as denominations compete for members.13
6C o n c l u s i o n
I present a model of religious competition that accounts for both the demand and supply
sides of the religious market. The egects of economic growth on religious participation and
pluralism in an open religious market are ambiguous ap r i o r i . Economic growth can increase
the opportunity costs of religious demand and supply, thereby working towards religion’s
demise. However, there are countervailing factors. Economic growth can lead to increased
inequality and improved technology of religious production, both of which increase the range
of observed religious behavior. Thus, competitive forces in an open religious market can lead
denominations to adapt to changing demand and supply conditions, thereby keeping religion
alive despite forces leading to secularization. In a regulated market, however, the egects
13Such analysis helps explain religious revival in post-communist eastern Europe. Communist ruling
parties attempted to regulate or eliminate all religious practices and institutions. Ocial anti-religious
sentiment vanished with the fall of communism, and as predicted by the model, many of the former communist
countries then experienced an increase in religious vitality. However, not all countries experienced this
upsurge, e.g., see Froese and Pfa (2001) for an examination of the East German and Polish exceptions.
The future of religion in eastern Europe is not clear, however, since more established religions are attempting
to reassert monopoly or privileged status [Stark and Finke (2000)].
24of economic growth are minimal since secularization occurs as a result of the regulations.
A monopoly competes only with the individuals’ non-aliation option, and this does not
change as economic growth occurs.
My results also provide a theoretical framework to interpret existing empirical work and
guide future empirical work. In cross-country panel regressions, Barro and McCleary (2002,
2003a, 2003b) ﬁnd that there is no relationship between income and religiosity (i.e., church
attendance, belief in heaven, etc.) when controlling for education, urbanization, and life
expectancy. The lack of a clear correlation is likely due to the presence of counteracting
factors also associated with rising income levels, some of which act to increase religiosity
while others act to decrease religiosity. The model suggests that a negative relationship will
be found once other supply and demand factors were controlled for. Future empirical work
should use the Barro-McCleary framework to explore other connections between economic
development and answer questions such as the following. Do changes in religious technology
also change as income levels increase? Is the negative impact of rising income levels on
religiosity diminishing? Does pluralism (which Barro and McCleary ﬁnd has a positive
impact on religiosity) increase as growth increases thereby countering the secularization
trend?
Indeed, there are additional issues related to the impact of growth on religion not con-
sidered in my model or existing empirical work that should be taken into account in future
research. Consider Iannoccone’s (1990) notion of “religious capital”–the idea that past
consumption within one denomination or religious tradition increases the value of present
consumption of that denomination. If years of state religion in Europe have tied individ-
uals’ religious capital to the dominant church, then even with recent deregulation we may
not observe religious revival because the capital is tied too strongly to the dominant church.
Thus, we may observe continued secularization in countries that recently opened their reli-
gious markets but were regulated in the past. This will apply more so to western Europe
than eastern Europe since communist rulers in eastern Europe restricted all denominations
thereby reducing religious capital for all denominations. This, in turn, helps explain the
religious revival in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism and the lack of revival in
25Western Europe where religious capital is still tied to the dominant churches. Moreover,
not properly controlling for centuries of past regulations in Barro-McCleary style regressions
may lead to estimates that understate the overall impact of state regulations on religiosity
over the long run as economic growth occurs.
A similar concern arises with the related notion of “spiritual capital.” Whereas religious
capital resides in the individual, spiritual capital operates at a societal level. Speciﬁcally,
spiritual capital is that subset of social capital–interpersonal networks that sustain norms
of trust and reciprocity–generated by religious organizations which acts to increase the sec-
ular returns to religious participation [Smidt (2003)]. As evidence of such secular returns,
Glaeser and Sacerdote (2002) ﬁnd that education in the United States is positively associated
with church attendance but negatively associated with religious beliefs (one interpretation
is that an increase in education decreases a person’s belief in heaven or hell, while simulta-
neously increasing the returns to religious participation by increasing the returns to social
connections). If spiritual capital develops coincidentally with economic growth in a thriving
religious market but does not develop in countries with regulated, stagnant religious markets,
then, again, regressions that do not control for past regulations may lead to estimates that
understate the role of regulations.
A number of theoretical extensions can be made to the model. Incorporating the religious
and spiritual capital ideas would require a repeated game setup. Denominations would then
not serve non-intersecting market niches as they do in my model since individuals may ﬁnd
it costly to switch aliations [Montgomery (1996)]. Another variation involves more richer
representations of denomination preferences. Barros and Garoupa (2002) assume that the
denomination acts to maximize the welfare of its members. In their formulation, the value
of a denomination’s public (club) good is independent of the demands placed by the denomi-
nation on its members, yet this assumption counters existing thought on how denominations
provide religious beneﬁts [Iannaccone (1992)]. Modeling digerent denomination preferences
has the potential to yield new insights into religious competition. Finally, the model could
formally account for the quality of the religious good. Religious producers adapt to chang-
ing religious demand by ogering innovative religious services, and formally accounting for
26digerent types of innovation may help us understand how the nature of religious services
change over time.
While each of these variations may yield added insights into our understanding of how
economic growth agects religion, none of them should alter the fundamental conclusions of
this paper. Religion is thriving in many parts of the world, and competitive forces are likely
to keep religion alive for now–at least in open religious markets.
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30Figure 1:  Some Religious Market Equilibria 
(a)  An equilibrium with D* = 3
(b)  A second equilibrium with D* = 3
(c)  An equilibrium with D* = 4
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